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Peace Revolution as a  




The Israeli-Palestinian struggle is a classic case of intractable conflict. Establishing 
a long-lasting change requires a revolutionary peace process. The paper describes peace 
revolution as a three-dimensional process—peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace-
keeping. Each of these three components is itself a three-level process. Peacemaking 
means involving different societal elements (leaders, elites, and people) in the struggle 
to reach a negotiated peace deal by using political-elite diplomacy, public diplomacy, 
and people-to-people diplomacy. Peacebuilding means constructing international, 
bilateral, and domestic frameworks for a stable peace. Peacekeeping means building 
political, militaristic, and civilian devices to maintain a stable social order.
Keywords: intractable conflict, peacemaking, peacebuilding, peacekeeping,  
Israeli-Palestinian conflict
1. Introduction
The Israeli-Palestinian is a classic case of intractable conflict where ordinary 
citizens are at the middle of the struggle. It is a lengthy fight where generation after 
generation is born into the reality of violence, despair, and suffering. The conflict 
seems to operate as a destructive evolutionary system that has a life of its own. 
Almost any substantial attempt to generate the conditions for a positive change in 
the Israeli-Palestinian case, so far, has failed and complicated the situation beyond 
imagination. The main argument of this essay is that a revolutionary peace process 
is required in order to break the evolutionary progression of violence and despair.
A revolutionary change-building program requires applying peacemaking, 
peacebuilding, and peacekeeping measures simultaneously.1 However, peacemaking, 
peacebuilding, and peacekeeping are controversial concepts that should have differ-
ent interpretations in different situations. For example, following the Second World 
War, the UN was established as a major peacekeeping institution. The aim was to 
create an institution that would be able to manage, stop, and prevent clashes between 
armies.2 The Israeli-Palestinian case—an intractable conflict where ordinary civil-
ians are at the center of the confrontation—is a different type of conflict. It requires 
1 Cf. Galtung [7] and Kelman [25]
2 See Snow [39].
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the establishment of different mechanisms to build, keep, and maintain order and 
stability.
The struggle to build a peaceful social order has to cope with different types of con-
flicts and crises. The three elements of a peace revolution—peacemaking, peacebuild-
ing, and peacekeeping—should be formulated according to the logic of the situation.3 
This paper suggests a multidimensional process, which might be appropriate for crises 
similar to the Israeli-Palestinian case. Peacemaking is a consensus-building process 
that involves different societal elements (leaders, political elites, and ordinary citizens) 
in efforts to conclude a negotiated peace deal.4 Peacebuilding means constructing 
international, bilateral, and domestic frameworks for a peaceful social order that copes 
with the needs and concerns of the conflicting parties.5 Peacekeeping suggests creating 
political, civilian, and militaristic means to maintain order and stability (Table 1).6
The structure of the paper follows the logic of the central argument—peace needs 
to be made, built, and kept. It is divided into sections: peacemaking, peacebuild-
ing, and peacekeeping. Each section focuses on different aspects of the challenge of 
change in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. However, each of the sections concretizes 
that the distinction between peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping is more 
of a theoretical outline that helps us to understand the complexity of the situation, 
shed light on the challenge of peace, and assist in developing new creative ideas.7
The paper combines theoretical research, comparative case studies, and experi-
mental practice. It grows out of the literature on peacemaking, peacebuilding, 
and peacekeeping. It draws lessons from peace processes in different situations of 
intractable conflict, such as the struggle for change in Northern Ireland during the 
“troubles” and the struggle to dismantle the Apartheid system in South Africa. It 
offers practical insights from the Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE)—a short-
term Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating assembly—which has been taking place 
in different forms, variations, and places. This multifaceted methodology intends to 
tackle the study of peace revolution from different points of view.
3 Cf. Popper [35].
4 See Fisher [5] and Handelman [12].
5 Cf. Fisher [5].
6 Cf. Handelman, ([12], 9–10). The three elements of peace revolution—peacemaking, peacebuilding, 
and peacekeeping—are intertwined. Moreover, often enough, it is hard to, clearly, distinguish between 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping. See Lakhdar, Brahimi. “Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Operations,” United Nations document A/55/305 – S/200/809, 21 (August 2000): 5.
7 Cf. Ratner [36] and James [24].
Category Meaning Means
Peacemaking Consensus building Diplomacy in three dimensions: political-elite 
diplomacy, public diplomacy, and people-to-people 
diplomacy
Peacebuilding Building a framework for a 
peaceful social order
International support, peaceful relationship-building 
between the parties and domestic reforms within each 
one of them
Peacekeeping Building mechanisms to 
keep law, order, and stability
Political, civilian, and militaristic mechanisms to cope 
with tensions, disputes, and crises
Table 1. 
Peace revolution as a three-dimensional process.
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2. Peacemaking
There is an agreement among peace researchers that peacemaking means 
negotiating a peace contract that can put an end to a conflict. This paper suggests a 
revolutionary peacemaking approach that attacks the challenge of reaching a nego-
tiated contract from different angles and viewpoints. It offers a look at a peacemak-
ing revolution as a consensus-building process, which involves key elements of the 
conflicting parties—leaders, elites, and people—in a multidimensional negotiating 
process. It is a more conclusive strategy than the dominant peacemaking experience 
in the Middle East, which, often enough, involves only leaders and elites.8
A revolutionary peacemaking approach, according to this paper, is a consensus-
building process that operates on three levels: political elite, “ordinary” people, and 
the interactions between the two. It suggests a three-level structure of peacemak-
ing diplomacy: political-elite diplomacy, public diplomacy, and people-to-people 
diplomacy (Table 2).
Political-elite diplomacy offers various channels of communication between 
official and unofficial elites of the opposing sides, who are interested in reaching a 
peaceful settlement to the conflict. In general, political-elite diplomacy comprises three 
main channels of interaction: track II diplomacy (unofficial dialog between elites who 
do not have official positions in the government), secret diplomacy (secret negotiations 
between officials), and track I diplomacy (formal negotiations between officials).9
Classical examples, such as the Oslo Accords of the 1990s, demonstrate that 
political-elite diplomacy offers efficient operative channels for helping leaders and 
elites reach innovative agreements in stalemate situations. Its main disadvantage is that 
it does not offer effective methods to involve the publics in the peacemaking efforts, 
prepare the people for a change, and help them deal with ongoing crises along the peace 
road. As a result, political-elite diplomacy is vulnerable to violent acts of spoilers, radi-
cals, and extremists, who are determined to use aggressive means to crush any effort 
to reach a negotiated peace contract. Indeed, violent events made a major contribution 
to the collapse of the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. The cumulative effect of the ongoing 
violence has led to a loss of public belief in the possibility of creating a constructive 
change. The decrease of public support of the peacemaking gives the momentum to the 
opposition of the peace process, who makes sure that the conflict will continue.10
People-to-people diplomacy offers various modes of interaction linking the 
opposing sides at the grassroots level, such as different dialog groups, multinational 
workshops, educational projects, scientific collaborations, and partnership in 
peacemaking grassroots organizations. More focused on peace dialog than other 
8 Cf. Handelman and Chowddhury [11].
9 I labeled these three modes of communication “the political-elite model.” See, for example, Handelman 
[18] and Handelman [17]. For a further discussion, see also Agha et al. [1].




Top Political-elite diplomacy Peacemaking engagement between political elites
Middle Public diplomacy Interactions between political elites and ordinary 
people
Bottom People-to-people diplomacy Peacemaking engagement between ordinary people
Table 2. 
Peacemaking diplomacy in three dimensions.
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collaborative projects, classical examples such as The Parents Circle-Families 
Forum11 and Seeds of Peace12 indicate that people-to-people diplomacy can be 
effective in building peace coalitions, showing that there are peace supporters on 
both sides,13 and preparing ordinary citizens for change. The main disadvantage 
of people-to-people diplomacy is that it, often enough, is disconnected from the 
leadership level. It hardly involves political leaders in the grassroots peacemaking 
channels and can barely motivate and influence them to reach innovative negotiat-
ing agreements. The result is that people-to-people diplomacy, which usually does 
not operate on a mass scale, faces many difficulties in transferring the spirit of 
change to the operational political level.14
Public diplomacy, in our multidimensional configuration, is designed to 
close the gaps of the two previous diplomatic modes (political-elite and people-
to-people) by using different methods of marketing, public relations, and social 
protest. It operates in two opposite directions. In one direction, public diplomacy 
provides instruments for leaders to prepare the public for a substantial peacemaking 
process, get their feedback on new ideas, receive their input on the limits of possible 
compromises, and generate public support in negotiating groundbreaking agree-
ments (top-down). In the other direction, public diplomacy offers tools for people 
to motivate political leaders to initiate a peacemaking process (bottom-up).15
This paper suggests creating a (peacemaking) public diplomacy institution—an 
Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress. A public negotiating congress 
(PNC) is a democratic peacemaking institution that invites representatives of the 
conflicting people to negotiate different solutions to their conflict. All congress 
participants, who reflect the political spectrum in the conflicting societies, would 
have to commit to principles of non-violent discourse.16
The congress is built to involve the conflicting publics in the peacemaking efforts, 
prepare the people for change, and motivate the leaderships to reach agreements. The 
idea to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress is inspired by the 
multiparty negotiations that enabled a revolutionary change in the struggle against 
Apartheid in South Africa and in Northern Ireland during the “troubles.”17
In South Africa and Northern Ireland, leaders came to the conclusion that they 
need a public diplomacy device to involve the public in the peace process. These 
leaders used diplomatic interactions to create the multiparty congresses. In the 
Israeli-Palestinian situation, so far, leaders do not even consider creating a similar 
public diplomacy device. They mainly focus on political-elite diplomacy in the 
effort to stabilize the situation. As an alternative choice, it is worth examining the 
possibility that an Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress—which can be 
regarded as an Israeli-Palestinian version of the multiparty negotiations in South 
Africa and Northern Ireland—will emerge from people-to-people interactions. One 
11 https://theparentscircle.org/en/pcff-home-page-en/
12 https://www.seedsofpeace.org/about/
13 A well-known characteristic of protracted conflict is the mirror image: each side believes that the 
rival is not a partner for peace and is not even capable to peruse it, to say the very least. The American 
psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner [3] discovered the “mirror image” during the Cold War.
14 Cf. Kelman [28].
15 The modern version of public diplomacy was developed during the Cold War. It was defined as “direct 
communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of 
their governments” Gifford ([8], 199). This version of public diplomacy is hardly relevant to cases like 
the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. For a further discussion, see Handelman [16].
16 For a further discussion, see Handelman [17].
17 For a further discussion on conflict and peacemaking in South Africa, see Sparks [41]. For a further 
discussion on the peace process in Northern Ireland, see Mitchell [31].
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people-to-people project that is designed to reach this goal is the Minds of Peace 
Experiment.
The Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE) is a short-term Israeli-Palestinian 
public negotiating assembly. The MOPE invites teams of Israelis and Palestinians to 
negotiate a peace deal, generally over a 2-day period of five sessions. The assembly is 
co-moderated by Israelis and Palestinians, who lead the interaction in a framework 
of general rules. The dialog is open to the public and invites its participation.
The Minds of Peace Experiment was conducted in various sizes and formats 
and in different locations. It has been demonstrated as a powerful instrument for 
people-to-people diplomacy. The various rounds of the MOPE indicate that the 
initiative is effective in involving ordinary people in the struggle for peace, prepar-
ing them for painful compromises, and creating peacemaking coalitions. However, 
without extensive use of public diplomacy, the influence of the MOPE is doomed to 
remain marginal. There is a necessity to create domestic and international pressure 
to institutionalize the initiative. The MOPE needs to grow, develop, and transform 
into a major revolutionary institution—an Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating 
Congress with substantial political influence.18
2.1 Concluding remarks
This paper suggests looking at a peacemaking revolution as a consensus-build-
ing development that involves the different societal elements—leaders, elite, and 
people—in the struggle for peace and stability. To reach this goal, it is necessary to 
create a balance between political-elite diplomacy and public diplomacy. Political-
elite diplomacy provides diplomatic channels for leaders to reach agreements. 
Public diplomacy intends to involve the public in the peacemaking efforts, prepare 
the people for a change, and motivate the leaderships to accomplish a settlement. 
A major public negotiating congress is a public diplomacy instrument that has the 
potential to create the equilibrium.19 On the one hand, it can serve as a political 
tool for leaders to create public support in a negotiating process that can produce 
a peace contract (top-down). On the other hand, it can serve as political instru-
ment for people to influence leaders and demand that they initiate an effective 
peacemaking policy (bottom-up).20 Moreover, a public negotiating congress can 
be discovered as a revolutionary device that could invite new political groups and 
leaders to the political arena.21
The multiparty negotiations in Northern Ireland and South Africa taught us that 
an Israeli-Palestinian Public Negotiating Congress can be an effective peacemaking 
institution that could open new political opportunities and push the train of change 
in unimagined directions. In both cases, political leaders established the multiparty 
talks in order to generate public support in the peacemaking. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
case, political-elite diplomacy is the main peacemaking setting. There are no signs of 
leadership interest and motivation to establish a public diplomacy device for involving 
the publics in the change-making efforts. As a desperate choice, this paper suggests 
considering the option of a public negotiating congress growing from people-to-
people interactions.
18 For a further discussion, see, for example, Handelman [14] and Handelman [15].
19 Creation of a major public negotiating congress, our proposal for a public diplomacy institution, is 
designed to connect three components: influencing the leaderships, preparing the public for change, 
and utilizing the media to create a peacemaking atmosphere in these two dimensions (leadership and 
people). For a further discussion on the concept of public diplomacy, see Gilboa [9] and Soroka [40].
20 For a further discussion, see Handelman [15].
21 Compare to Huntington [22], who suggests a model of sociopolitical revolution.
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The Minds of Peace Experiment is a grassroots initiative that intends to demonstrate 
the peacemaking potential of a major public negotiating congress, to help evaluate its 
possible outcomes, and to generate support for its creation. However, I did not find 
any example where a major public negotiating congress emerged of people-to-people 
activities.22 Perhaps, the Minds of Peace initiative is doomed to fail like almost all other 
peacemaking initiatives so far. Nevertheless, it is impossible to predict the future.23
3. Peacebuilding
Peacebuilding, in this paper, means building the conditions for a peaceful social 
order that can cope with the fears, needs, and concerns of the opposing factions. It 
is a multidimensional configuration, which needs to cope with challenges in three 
main dimensions: international, generating international support for a peaceful 
social order and marginalizing the impact of international spoilers; interparty, 
building peaceful relationships between the conflicting parties; and intraparty, 
domestic reforms within the opposing parties in order to cope with internal obsta-
cles for peace and stability (Table 3).
International. In this paper, we suggest looking at the Israeli-Palestinian 
struggle as a communal conflict. It is a struggle between two communities—Israeli 
and Palestinian—who were destined to live side by side. We believe that this 
approach has the best chances to cope with the conflict constructively and help the 
conflicting parties to reach a negotiated resolution. Any attempt at “globalizing” the 
conflict—for example, analyzing it in Huntington’s terms of clash of civilizations—
marginalizes the ability to resolve the conflict or, even, to transform it.24 However, 
there are certain problems that Israelis and Palestinians cannot solve by themselves. 
They need international assistance in coping with essential problems standing in 
the way of peace and stability.
Coping with the problem of the Palestinian refugees, which will, probably, need 
to relocate in different locations,25 and the urgent need to marginalize the impact of 
an international spoiler, such as Iran, are two examples of major problems for which 
Israelis and Palestinians will need international assistance and intervention. This 
means that any realistic peace initiative needs to establish working relationships with 
the international community in order to guarantee its commitment and support.
Diplomacy, as a key instrument of foreign affairs, is the tool to reach inter-
national support. Naturally, there are major disagreements between Israelis and 
Palestinians upon the very essence of the desired international intervention in the 
peace process. For example, who are the international players that should take part 
in the peace process? What will be their role? Where is the line between legitimate 
and illegitimate intervention?26
According to the methodology suggested in this paper, Israelis and 
Palestinians need to reach a peace agreement in bilateral negotiations (peace-
making), while the international community should support it, marginalize the 
influence of spoilers, and assist in implementing the agreements. The boundaries 
22 The multiparty negotiations in South Africa and Northern Ireland established by political leaders. See, 
for example, Mandela [30].
23 See, for example, Popper [34].
24 Cf. Hassner [19].
25 See, for example, the Geneva Initiative: http://www.geneva-accord.org/.
26 No doubt that Israelis and Palestinians see any American intervention in the peace process in different 
lights.
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of international intervention should be negotiated and determined early in the 
peacemaking stage.
Interparty. There is a broad consensus that the only feasible settlement to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a “two-state solution”—the establishment of a 
Palestinian state beside Israel. Nevertheless, it seems impossible to completely sepa-
rate between the two national units. Interaction between Israelis and Palestinians 
is inevitable. For example, there is no continuity of land between the West Bank 
and Gaza. It looks that the holy places in Jerusalem require a special arrangement 
in a framework of two-state solution. Arab residents of Israel are relatives of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.27
Israelis and Palestinians will need to create mechanisms for building peaceful 
relationships, which are critical for maintaining peace, order, and stability. The 
challenge necessitates multidimensional peacebuilding measures, including joint 
economic projects, education for peace and tolerance, and reconciliation. Let me 
demonstrate the challenge by focusing on certain aspects of these three dimensions:
1. Economic cooperation: Ordinary Palestinians and Israelis are struggling in their 
daily life. Palestinians are struggling to make a decent living and support their 
families in a difficult situation of developing their society, while Israelis are 
struggling under the burden of the high cost of living in Israel. Economic coop-
eration can benefit the two sides. For example, Israelis are interested in buying 
quality low-price goods, which Palestinians know how to manufacture and sell.
Creating Israeli-Palestinian free-trade zones can benefit the two sides.28 Israelis, 
who are interested in buying quality goods at reasonable prices, can create a market 
for Palestinians who can manufacture quality goods at a low cost. The economic 
interests of the two sides can be a vehicle for peaceful relation building. For exam-
ple, it can demonstrate to the people the interdependence of the two societies; it can 
assist in developing friendly relationships between adversaries (or more precisely 
former adversaries); and it has the potential of reducing hostility and the impact of 
prejudice on the attitude of people of the opposing sides toward each other.
2. Education: Hostile relationships between neighbors, which are destined to 
live side by side, are a proven recipe for clash. To live in a peaceful social 
27 See, for example, Handelman [17].





International Generating international support 
for peace and stability
Diplomacy
Interparty Building peaceful relationships 
between adversaries
Sociopolitical initiatives, such as economic 
collaboration, education for peace, and 
reconciliation projects
Intraparty Building the foundations for order 
and stability in the opposing 
parties
Domestic reforms within the opposing parties
Table 3. 
Peacebuilding as a three-dimensional configuration.
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order, the two sides—Israelis and Palestinians—will need to overcome classi-
cal symptoms of intractable conflict, such as chronic mistrust, prejudice, and 
dehumanization of the other. Education, in general, and peace education, in 
particular, can play an important role in coping with the challenge.
Education has a critical influence on worldview and the sociopolitical attitude 
of human beings, especially of the young generation. Israelis and Palestinians will 
need to do major reforms in their educational curriculum—such as stopping the 
incitement, teaching the very essence of tolerance and pluralism, and even teaching 
the other’s culture and traditions. However, changing educational programs is not 
easy. The old system has its own dynamic evolution and protective mechanisms.
Observations show that in transition periods, between war and peace, educa-
tional systems, often enough, are transformed or more precisely revolutionized, 
by force. For example, after the Second World War, the Allied Forces forced 
major domestic reforms in the educational systems of Japan and Germany. They 
insisted that the new educational system be based on liberal values.29 These 
paradoxical cases, where peace and liberal education were forced by coercive 
means, have a general lesson. They demonstrate that building the conditions for 
peace and stability, by establishing a new framework of rules and institutions, 
cannot be free from elements of force, power, and manipulation.30 Good inten-
tions are not enough.
3. Reconciliation: In the middle of the twentieth century, after the Second World 
War, it was almost impossible to imagine peace and reconciliation in Eu-
rope. About 50 years later, former entrenched enemies, such as Germany and 
France, established a confederation, the European Union. Today, it is almost 
impossible to imagine a violent conflict between members of the EU. It looks 
that there is a reconciliation in Europe. Is reconciliation possible in the Middle 
East? Is reconciliation possible between two national communities, Israelis 
and Palestinians, whose ethnic, religious, and cultural identities seem to be so 
different? Is reconciliation possible after about 120 years of intractable conflict 
that seems to have a life, dynamic, and evolution of its own?
Analyzing the situation in the light of Huntington’s theory—the clash of civi-
lization—leads to pessimism.31 In this framework, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
is a point of clash between different cultural units (civilizations). Therefore, it is 
impossible to solve the conflict and reconcile between the parties. The old city of 
Jerusalem, which is extremely important to believers of different religions, demon-
strates the problem.
In contrast to Huntington’s theory, this paper suggests analyzing the situation 
from a different perspective. Huntington’s theory globalizes the problem and calls it 
a symptom of “clash of civilizations,” while our approach examines the conflict as a 
communal struggle—a conflict between two national communities. Our approach 
holds better chances of coping with a difficult situation. Huntington’s theory offers 
despair in advance. Israelis and Palestinians cannot afford to be engaged in a cold 
peace. For peace and stability, it is mandatory to develop tools for reconciliation.
From a practical perspective, there are good reasons for optimism in this direction. 
Palestinians, who believe that the Arab states have part of the blame in their situation, 
see the deteriorating situation of the Arab world in contrast to the prosperity of the 
29 See, for example, Schaller [37] and Shillony [38].
30 Cf. Handelman [17].
31 Huntington [21]
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West and Israel. It is reasonable to assume that they have a desire (or, at least, a secret 
desire) to be part of the success. Israelis have aspired, for a long time, to become part 
of the new Middle East and stop being a fortified isolated castle. Peace and reconcilia-
tion between Israelis and Palestinians may open a gate to fulfill these aspirations.
There are grassroots initiatives that focus on reconciliation between the two 
parties.32 These successful programs operate on a very minor scale. They need to 
expand, integrate into educational systems, and operate on a mass-scale level.
Intraparty. The focus on the internal situation within the opposing parties 
adds another important dimension to the struggle for building a momentum for 
a peace revolution. It suggests domestic reforms within the opposing societies, 
within the Israeli and the Palestinian societies, in order to create opportunities to 
resolve the struggle and to form a framework for a long-lasting stable peace. The 
idea of suggesting domestic reforms within each party draws on insights of consti-
tutional economists, like James Buchanan [4], and political scientists, like Samuel 
Huntington [22]. These thinkers emphasized that an adequate framework of rules 
and institutions is a necessary condition for the evolutionary transition from social 
chaos to a peaceful social order.
In our context, domestic reforms that improve the internal cohesion of each 
society, the rule of law, and the accountability of political leaders may help the 
opposing populations to discover the value of peace, to start believing that it can 
be achieved, and to explore possibilities for reaching it. These necessary measures 
could potentially create an effective framework for a substantial peace process and 
reduce the impact of radicals, extremists, and spoilers. The “paradox of violence” 
can demonstrate the importance of reforming major elements within each of the 
opposing societies.33
A classical characteristic of intractable conflict is the paradox of violence—
almost any progression toward a positive change is likely to cause a growth in the 
level of violence. It is possible to identify two main reasons for this observation. 
The first is spoilers—radical elements increase efforts to sabotage almost any kind 
of peace process by violent means. The second is internal tensions—any progress 
toward peace between opposing societies tends to increase tensions within each 
one of them. This symptom characterizes developing societies that lack sufficient 
instruments to cope with domestic tensions and disagreements by peaceful means. 
Let me elaborate on the second reason, which is more related to the focus of this 
section (domestic reforms in the conflicting societies).
A society is built of various elements, such as individuals, ethnic groups, 
economic corporations, religious congregations, and political associations. These 
different social elements do not necessarily hold similar priorities, preferences, 
and sociopolitical agenda. Intractable conflict is a unifying force. Opponents may 
collaborate in order to fight a joint enemy. However, as soon as there is progress 
toward peace, tensions within each of the conflicting parties appear and become a 
dominant factor. For example, the struggle against the Apartheid system in South 
Africa had unified the nonwhite people. This “unification” made the impression 
that the struggle is between the “black” population and the “white” one. However, 
the progress toward a new governmental system exposed the diversity within the 
“black” people and led to violent clashes within the nonwhite camp.34
Israeli academics have emphasized that the Palestinian authority is a developing 
entity.35 It lacks instruments to cope with social crises that can follow transition 
32 For example, visit http://www.musalaha.org/.
33 See Handelman [17].
34 See, for example, Ottaway [32].
35 See, for example, Inbar [23].
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from one sociopolitical order to another. The unilateral withdrawal of the Israeli 
forces from the Gaza Strip, led by the former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 
2005, demonstrates the difficulties and the obstacles.
Sharon’s plan to withdraw Israeli troops, and about 8000 Jewish settlers, from 
Gaza and 4 small areas in the West Bank had a dramatic effect on the situation. 
Following the unilateral withdrawal, Israel—a modern country with established 
democratic institutions—survived the shock, but the Palestinian authority 
collapsed. The events that followed were a coup by Hamas in Gaza and a bloody 
civil war within the Palestinian society. Since then the Palestinian society is 
politically divided. The radical Islamic movement, Hamas, which is commit-
ted to radical Islamism, controls Gaza, while the secular nationalist movement 
Fatah, whose official agenda is building an independent Palestinian civil society 
based on the 1967 cease-fire line (two-state solution), administers the major 
parts of the West Bank.
Israeli scholars point out that the tragic situation in the Gaza case enfolds a gen-
eral lesson—any intention to divide the land endangers the security of Israel. The 
Palestinian authority in the West Bank is a developing entity that lacks instruments 
to cope with social crises that can follow a transition from one sociopolitical order to 
another. There is a grave danger that any Israeli withdrawal from the West bank will 
lead to a repeat of the Gaza scenario—collapse of the Palestinian  authority, radi-
cal elements, such as Hamas and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), taking 
control and launching missiles at the center of Israel.36
In any framework of partition of the land between the two peoples, domestic 
reforms in the Palestinian society are a precondition to a successful peace process. 
For the sake of peace and stability, it is necessary for the Palestinians to establish the 
foundations of a modern independent state: building public institutions; creating 
a stable, efficient, and transparent administration; disarming violent groups; and 
developing all other mechanisms of a decent civil society.
The difficult task of creating the conditions for peace and stability requires 
preparing the opposing societies, Palestinians and Israelis, for coexistence in any 
possible framework. This means that domestic reforms in the Palestinian society 
are not enough to create a long-lasting change. There is a need for domestic reforms 
within the state of Israel, especially, in regard to the sensitive issue of “national 
identity” and its practical implications.
Israel is a multicultural society. The Israeli population includes a majority of 
Jewish citizens who came from different parts of the world and a large minority 
of non-Jewish citizens (about 20% Arabs). Nevertheless, Israel is considered 
a Jewish state. It is true that a major part of Arab-Israelis’ integration in the 
Israeli society is expressed through participation of the Arab population in the 
democratic processes of Israel.37 Nevertheless, the fact that a non-Jewish popula-
tion belongs to a Jewish state holds many elements of exclusion. The politics of 
exclusion is expressed in many dimensions of Israeli social life. For example, in 
the psychological dimension, many Arab-Israelis see themselves as second-class 
citizens, and in the symbolic sphere, the national symbols of the country are 
taken from Jewish tradition.
According to pluralist perception, having a national home is a basic need. 
Human beings need a place that will accept them simply because they belong.38 The 
non-Jewish citizens of Israel have a problem seeing the Jewish state as their national 
36 Cf. Inbar [23].
37 See, for example, Landau [29].
38 In Robert Frost’s words, “Home is the place where, when you go there, they have to take you in.”
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home. As Professor Joseph Agassi [2] noted, this problem has direct and indirect 
implications on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
According to Agassi, establishing a stable decent Palestinian state will neces-
sarily lead to tensions within Israel. The reason is that Arab-Israelis, who live in 
different parts of the country and have difficulties seeing the Jewish state as their 
national home, can see the new Palestinian state as their natural national home-
land. The inevitable result, according to Agassi, is that they will aspire to live (on 
their land in Israel) under a Palestinian rule. Jewish Israelis are likely to object and 
reject such a drastic political motivation. The different motivations can lead to a 
dangerous clash.
Due to the situation of the Arab world, in general, and the Palestinian society 
in particular, the establishment of a decent and stable Palestinian state looks like a 
dream at this stage. However, Agassi’s analysis enfolds a lesson—Israelis will have 
to think seriously about how to better integrate ethnic minorities in Israel. The 
existence of Arab citizens of Israel has many important effects upon the conduct of 
the country in general and its relations with Palestinians in the territories in par-
ticular.39 Improved relationships between the Arab minority and the Jewish major-
ity in Israel might pave the way for better relations with a future Palestinian polity 
and create direct and indirect opportunities for peacemaking. It can help the Jewish 
population in Israel to overcome the obsessive fear of losing the Jewish character of 
the state. The implications can be substantial and dramatic. For example, the people 
in Israel might overcome prejudice against Arabs, be more receptive to examine 
seriously creative solutions to the conflict, and even consider including Arab repre-
sentatives in Israeli delegations for future negotiations.
3.1 Concluding remarks
Transition from one social order to another is difficult for almost any society. A 
transitional period for developing entities, which have hardly developed political 
and social mechanisms to cope with new challenges, can end in disaster. Huntington 
[22] pointed out that the lack of an effective framework of rules and institutions 
in changing societies can be used and abused by a new sociopolitical force to take 
control. The new political player who comes to power is not necessarily able to, 
interested to, or knowledgeable about how to establish a new sociopolitical order 
that can benefit the members of society.
The collapse of Gaza to the hand of the radical movement Hamas demonstrates 
the danger of drastic unilateral moves in the West Bank situation. Moreover, it 
shows that the three elements of peacebuilding (international support, relationship 
building, and domestic reforms) are intertwined. For example, it is quite clear that 
Palestinian domestic difficulties are not the only internal Palestinian problems. 
They are also an Israeli problem and a regional problem. It is in the best interests of 
Israelis, Egyptians, and Jordanians to help the Palestinians establish a viable stable 
polity that could fight the expansion of religious fanaticism.
The analysis of the peacebuilding challenge in the Israeli-Palestinian situation 
also demonstrates that peace revolution is a composite of peacemaking, peacebuild-
ing, and peacekeeping. These elements are intertwined and need to be applied 
simultaneously. Peacebuilding measures (international support, relationship 
building, and domestic reforms) can help in providing a safety net for stability 
39 Cf. Landau [29], who notes that many Arab-Israelis have family relatives among the Palestinians in  
the territories.
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during a peacemaking process. It helps to guarantee that if the negotiation fails, the 
outcomes will not be disastrous as they have been in the past.
4. Peacekeeping
After the Second World War, peacekeeping was understood as division between 
entrenched enemies.40 The guiding principle was “Good fences create good neigh-
bors.” The end of the Cold War and the growing numbers of intrastate struggles 
have led to alteration in this view of peacekeeping. The concept of peacekeeping 
was extended to cases where it is impossible to hermetically separate enemies.41
The unavoidable contact between Israelis and Palestinians shows that it is 
mandatory to design and implement a nontraditional peacekeeping strategy. A 
nontraditional strategy involves different societal elements—such as citizens, 
political leaders, and special security forces—in the efforts to maintain peace, order, 
and stability.
The challenge of peacekeeping is multidimensional. To simplify and demon-
strate the need to design a multidimensional strategy to keep peace and stability, 
the paper suggests focusing on three levels of peacekeeping: political, military, and 
civilian: An Israeli-Palestinian Congress for Peace and Security can be a political 
institution for monitoring joint activities and coping with tensions, disputes, and ad 
hoc sociopolitical problems between the two sides. A joint border security force can 
be established to protect the east border of a new Palestinian state in the West Bank 
(the border between the new Palestine and Jordan in a framework of two-state solu-
tion). A joint civil guard can be established to help in keeping order and stability in 
places where Israeli and Palestinian civilians are in direct contact (Table 4).
Let me elaborate.
Politics. Peace revolution is a dynamic process, which has an evolutionary 
dynamic. Political instruments that were created to lead a change in the peacemak-
ing phase need to be modified and changed in the peacekeeping stage. This evolu-
tionary progression needs to be considered at the beginning of the process.
The peacemaking section of this paper proposes establishing a powerful instru-
ment for the peacemaking part of a peace revolution—a major Israeli-Palestinian 
Public Negotiating Congress. The congress is a consensus-building institution that 
is planned to involve different societal elements of the conflicting societies (leaders, 
elites, and people) in the peace efforts. Its main tasks are to offer political alternatives 
to the violent struggle, prepare the publics for a change, and motivate the leaderships 
to reach agreements. However, once a peace agreement has been achieved, this peace-
making institution needs to be transformed, or it will become useless. The logic of the 
evolutionary progression of a peacemaking revolution proposes that a pubic negotiat-
ing congress—a major peacemaking institution—should be transformed into a major 
peacekeeping institution, which could be labeled as congress for peace and security.42
The inevitable friction between Israelis and Palestinians will require political 
instruments to cope with inevitable tensions, disagreements, and joint problems. 
In the post-conflict phase, a joint peacekeeping congress could deal with tensions, 
disputes, and ad hoc problems, initiate and coordinate joint projects in various 
fields (such as education, economics, and politics), and establish mechanisms for 
reconciliation.
40 See, for example, Snow [39].
41 Ibid., 102–103.
42 See, for example, Handelman [17, 22–24]
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Similar to the UN, which is the global peacekeeping institution, the main 
actual power of the peacekeeping congress (Israeli-Palestinian Congress for Peace 
and Security) is its very existence. In the peacemaking stage, a public negotiating 
congress involves the publics in the struggle for peace and generates public pressure 
to reach a settlement. In the post-conflict phase, the peacekeeping congress should 
remind everyone of the high cost of conflict and the precious value of peace.
A difficult question is how to start and build this institutional evolution (from 
peacemaking congress to a peacekeeping congress), which is so necessary for a 
peace revolution. Unfortunately, this critical discussion is not in scope of this 
paper.43
Military. In a framework of a “two-state solution,” Israel demands that the new 
Palestinian state will be demilitarized. However, it is a joint interest of Israelis and 
Palestinians that the eastern border—the border between the new state of Palestine 
and Jordan—be protected from invasion of hostile forces (such as ISIS). Who will 
protect the border between Palestine and Jordan after Israel pulls back its military 
forces from the area?
In different rounds of the Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE)—a small-scale 
Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating assembly, which was conducted in different 
locations with different delegations of Israelis and Palestinians—the delegations 
agreed on the creation of a joint Israeli-Palestinian security force that will operate 
in a security zone near the border.44 This idea has different versions with differ-
ent implications. For example, in some of the assemblies, the delegations agreed 
that the joint security force would become part of the IDF. In other assemblies, 
Palestinians were concerned that soldiers, with IDF uniforms, in Palestinian areas 
would remind the people of the occupation and the consequences could be harm-
ful. To prevent such complications, the delegations in these assemblies agreed 
that the border guard unit would have their own special uniforms. In addition, it 
is worth considering that the border guard unit will be linked to Israel, Palestine, 
and the Israeli-Palestinian Congress for Peace and Security (which was, previously, 
proposed as a political peacekeeping institution). Of course, the details need to be 
discussed and negotiated by the two sides.
Another option which was raised by some scholars is that, eventually, the 
Palestinians will need to be in charge of protecting their border. They propose a 
two-stage process. In the first stage, an international force will protect the border 
43 The goal of the Minds of Peace project, which was briefly presented at the peacemaking section, is to 
begin such an evolutionary process. A detailed analysis of the initiative and other options to reach the 
same goal is beyond the focus of this paper.





Political Coping with sociopolitical problems, coordinating 
joint activities, and monitoring shared mechanisms
Israeli-Palestinian Congress for 
Peace and Security
Military Protecting the border between a new Palestinian state 
and Jordan
A joint border guard
Civilian and 
police
Coping with civilian problems and keeping law and 
order in friction points
Security cooperation and a 
joint civil guard
Table 4. 
Peacekeeping in three dimensions.
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and train a Palestinian border guard unit. In the second stage, the international 
force will leave, and the Palestinian force will take responsibility.45
It seems that the first proposal has better chances of being accepted by Israelis 
and Palestinians. It is hard to imagine Israelis and Palestinians agreeing that an 
international force, and later a new Palestinian security unit, will be in charge of 
their security. A joint Israeli-Palestinian border guard unit, as in the first proposal, 
can indirectly serve also as a peacebuilding instrument. Its cooperative feature 
can help to explore possibilities of improving the relations between Israelis and 
Palestinians.
Civilian and police. The security challenges in the making of a new 
social order are multidimensional. The interdependence between Israelis and 
Palestinians, which makes the security problem so difficult to handle, neverthe-
less holds peacebuilding opportunities. Let me demonstrate by focusing on the 
three main problems: order and stability within Palestinian territories, settle-
ments, and holy places.
1. Order and stability within Palestine: As already mentioned, the Palestinian 
society is suffering from symptoms of a developing entity. Israelis, who object 
to the “two-state solution,” claim that any attempt to implement this type of 
solution is doomed to fail and would endanger the security of Israel.46 The 
fear is that a new Palestinian state in the West Bank will collapse into civil war 
similar to the Gaza crisis in 2008. Since civil wars usually end in the victory of 
one party and not power sharing,47 the results can be a hostile regime (such as 
Hamas and ISIS) in the West Bank. That would be a serious security threat near 
Israeli towns.
Building a strong and efficient Palestinian police force is necessary to prevent 
this dangerous scenario. Israel can help in training the Palestinian police. The 
cooperation between security forces of the two sides, which works quite well in the 
West Bank, could be modified, tailored, and expanded for the new situation. In 
addition, a joint civil guard can be established in order to help in stabilizing a new 
social order.
2. Jewish settlements in the West Bank: Any form of solution, which is based 
on the establishment of a Palestinian state, has to cope with the presence of 
Jewish settlements (about 400,000 settlers) in the West Bank. The “optimal” 
solution to the problem is probably a mix of three options: (1) border modi-
fications and land exchange: annexation of Jewish settlements to Israel and 
compensation to Palestinians in return; (2) evacuation of Jewish settlements; 
and (3) Jewish settlements in the West Bank will remain under Palestinian 
sovereignty.48
The settlements in the West Bank that cannot be annexed to Israel (option 1) and 
cannot be evacuated (option 2) will need to remain under Palestinian sovereignty 
(option 3). This will create major security problems. For example, who will solve 
disputes between Jewish neighbors? Should religious Jewish settlers call Palestinian 
45 Compare to https://www.fpa.org/usr_doc/Israel_and_Palestine_Two_States_for_Two_Peoples_2010.
pdf pp./48–49.
46 Cf. Inbar [23].
47 Cf. Toft [42].
48 For different peace plans, see Golan [10].
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police in such matters? Can a Palestinian police officer serve as a moderator in a 
dispute between religious Jews?
A joint Israeli-Palestinian civil guard can be helpful in such situations. It could 
assist in coping with such sensitive problems that are beyond the capacity of a regu-
lar police force. Of course, the two sides will need to discuss and negotiate the very 
essence of any joint civil guard. This project—the creation of a joint civil guard—has 
also peacebuilding implications. It can contribute to the transformation of hostile 
relationships between entrenched enemies who fight one another into cooperative 
relationships between neighbors who are trying to cope with joint problems.
3. The holy places in Jerusalem: The holy city of Jerusalem, the walled area, which 
is so important to believers of different religions, needs to be administered 
with much care, sophistication, and creativity. A joint civil guard, which will 
be subject to a joint municipality, can take into consideration the needs of 
those who care about the city. It can become a symbol of pluralism, tolerance, 
and peace.
4.1 Concluding remarks
This section suggests three peacekeeping mechanisms that operate in three 
intertwined dimensions: congress for peace and security (politics), a joint border 
guard (military), and a joint civil guard (civilian). It would be important, efficient, 
and beneficial that Israelis and Palestinians discuss and negotiate the structure, 
authority, and operation of any peacekeeping mechanism beginning as early as the 
peacemaking step. It could help avoid future complications when implementing any 
negotiated peace contract. Moreover, it could be a trust-building move that demon-
strates to the people that any peace agreement would be signed and implemented 
only when mechanisms to keep security, order, and stability are established.49
5. Summary
Intractable conflict is a severe crisis. It is a longtime struggle where generations 
in turn are born into the reality of aggression, despair, and violence. The conflict 
seems to have a life of its own. It is like a disease that controls the body. A revolu-
tionary process is needed to create a sustainable change.
Revolution is an “overthrow of an established social order” Friedrich ([6], 5). 
Peace revolution is a conclusive attack on the foundations and structure of the 
conflict and the sociopolitical destructive mechanisms that constantly feed it. Peace 
revolution is planned to involve, at least, three key elements of the opposing parties 
(leaders, elites, and people) in a change-building process that tackles the conflict 
from different levels, sides, and directions.
A revolutionary peace process needs to take into consideration that peace needs 
to be made, built, and kept. Peacemaking suggests diplomatic instruments to 
involve key social elements of the conflicting parties (leaders, elites, and people) in 
a multidimensional negotiation of a peace contract. Peacebuilding offers a program 
to construct a negotiated framework for a new social order, which copes with the 
needs, fears, and concerns of the conflicting factions. Peacekeeping advocates the 
49 Anwar Sadat, the former president of Egypt, in his historical speech in the Israeli Knesset, addressed, 
quite effectively, the pathological Israeli fear. To read the speech, visit https://ecf.org.il/media_items/833.
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creation of a multidimensional system of different operating mechanisms (politi-
cal, militaristic. and civilian) to maintain law and order.
Distinguishing between the three elements of a peace revolution (peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and peacekeeping) is not always clear. Moreover, as this paper shows, 
these elements are intertwined. It will be a mistake to concentrate on one element 
of the challenge of peace (such as peacemaking) without taking into account the 
others. It can lead to the same old familiar failures.
Intractable conflict, similar to almost all phenomena in the social sciences, is 
a complex phenomenon.50 It is a composite of components, factors, and variables 
of different dimensions, such as psychology, economics, and religion. Peace revo-
lutionaries need to take into account, as much as possible, the complexity of the 
situation and, accordingly, construct an innovative multidimensional approach to 
change. This is the main message of this paper.
50 For a thoughtful discussion on the very essence of complex phenomena, see Hayek [20].
Notes on contributor
Sapir Handelman is the co-laureate of the 2010 Peter Becker Award for Peace and 
Conflict Research. He is an associate professor (senior lecturer) and the head of the 
conflict studies division at Achva Academic College, Israel. Dr. Handelman founded 
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
17
Peace Revolution as a Three-Dimensional Process: The Israeli-Palestinian Case
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90246
and leads the Minds of Peace NGO, which is based on his concepts of conflict 
resolution in intractable conflicts.
Author details
Sapir Handelman
Minds of Peace and Achva Academic 
College, Israel
*Address all correspondence to: sapir.
handelman@gmail.com
Democracy and Human Rights
18
References
[1] Agassi J. Liberal Nationalism for 
Israel: Towards an Israeli National 
Identity. Jerusalem and New York: Gefen 
Pub. House; 1999
[2] Agha H et al. Trach-II Diplomacy: 
Lesson from the Middle East. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 2004
[3] Bronfenbrenner U. The Mirror image 
in soviet-American relations: A social 
Psychologist’s report. Journal of Social 
Issues. 1961;17:45-56
[4] Buchanan J. Moral Science and Moral 
Order. Vol. 17 of the Collected Works 
of James M. Buchanan. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund; 2001
[5] Fisher R. The potential for 
Peacebuilding: Forging a bridge from 
peacekeeping to Peacemaking. Peace & 
Change. 1993;18(3):247-266
[6] Friedrich C, editor. Revolution. 
New York: Atherton Press; 1966
[7] Galtung J. Peace, War and 
Defense: Essays in Peace Research I1. 
Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers; 1976
[8] Gifford M. Managing Public 
Diplomacy. The Washington Quarterly. 
1985;8(3):199-213
[9] Gilboa E. Searching for a theory  
of public diplomacy. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social 
Science. 2008;616(March): 
55-77
[10] Golan G. Israel and Palestine: 
Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo 
to Disengagement. Princeton: Markus 
Wiener Publishers; 2006
[11] Handelman S, Chowdhury J. The 
limits of political-elite diplomacy: 
Leaders, people and social conflicts. 
Israel Affairs. 2017;23(3):465-495
[12] Handelman S. Peacemaking 
Contractualism: A Peacemaking 
approach to cope with difficult 
situations of intractable conflict. 
Global Change, Peace & Security. 
2016;28(1):123-144
[13] Handelman S, Pearson F. 
Peacemaking in intractable conflict – A 
Contractualist approach. International 
Negotiation. 2014;19:1-34
[14] Handelman S. People-to-People 
Diplomacy in Israel and Palestine: The 
Minds of Peace Experiment. London 
and New York: Routledge; 2014
[15] Handelman S. The minds of peace 
experiment: A laboratory for people-
to-people diplomacy. Israel Affairs. 
2012a;18(1):1-11
[16] Handelman S. Two complementary 
settings of Peacemaking diplomacy: 
Political-elite diplomacy and public 
diplomacy. Diplomacy & Statecraft. 
2012c;23(1):162-178
[17] Handelman S. Conflict and 
Peacemaking in Israel-Palestine: Theory 
and Application. London and New York: 
Routledge; 2011
[18] Handelman S. Two complementary 
views of Peacemaking: The Palestinian-
Israeli case. Middle East Policy. 
2008;15(3):57-66
[19] Hassner RE. “To halve and to 
hold”: Conflicts over sacred space and 
the problem of indivisibility. Security 
Studies. 2003;12(4):1-33
[20] Hayek F. Studies in Philosophy, 
Politics and Economics. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press; 1967
[21] Huntington S. The clash of 
civilizations? Foreign Affairs. 
1993;72(3):22-49
19
Peace Revolution as a Three-Dimensional Process: The Israeli-Palestinian Case
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90246
[22] Huntington S. Political Order in 
Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press; 1968
[23] Inbar E. Israel’s Palestinian 
challenge. Israel Affairs. 
2006;12(4):823-842
[24] James A. Peacekeeping in 
International Politics. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press; 1990
[25] Kelman H. Conflict resolution and 
reconciliation: A social-psychological 
perspective on ending violent conflict 
between identity groups. Landscapes of 
Violence. 2010;1(1):5. Available from: 
http://scholarworks.umass.edu/lov/
vol1/iss
[26] Kelman H. Social-psychological 
dimensions of international conflict. 
In: Zartman W, editor. Peacemaking 
in International Conflict: Methods & 
Techniques (Rev. Ed.). Washington, DC: 
U.S. Institute of Peace; 2007a
[27] Kelman H. The Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process and its vicissitudes: 
Insights from attitude theory. American 
Psychologist. 2007b;63(4):287-303
[28] Kelman H. Negotiation as 
interactive problem solving. 
International Negotiation: A Journal of 
Theory and Practice. 1996;1(1):99-123
[29] Landau S. Settings, factors and 
phenomena of conflict in Israeli society. 
In: Albrecht HJ, Simon JM, Rezaei H, 
Rohne HC, Kiza E, editors. Conflicts 
and Conflict Resolution in Middle 
Eastern Societies – Between Tradition and 
Modernity. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt; 
2006. pp. 257-274
[30] Mandela N. Long Walk to Freedom: 
The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company; 
1994
[31] Mitchell G. Making Peace. New York, 
NY: Alfred A. Knopf; 1999
[32] Ottaway M. South Africa: 
The Struggle for a New Order. 
Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution; 1993
[33] Pearson F. Cultural factors in 
Peacemaking: The Israeli-Palestinian 
context. Israel Affairs. 2017;23(3): 
525-544
[34] Popper K. The Poverty of Historicism. 
London: Routledge; 2002
[35] Popper K. Models, instruments  
and truth. In: Notturno M, editor. The 
Myth of the Framework: In Defense  
of Science and Rationality. London  
and New York: Routledge; 1994. 
pp. 154-185
[36] Ratner S. The New UN 
Peacekeeping: Building Peace in 
Lands of Conflicts after the Cold War. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press; 1996
[37] Schaller M. The American 
Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the 
Cold War in Asia. New York: Oxford 
University Press; 1985
[38] Shillony B-A. Politics and Culture 
in Wartime Japan. Oxford: Oxford 
Clarendon Press; 1981
[39] Snow D. Cases in International 
Relation. 4th ed. New York: Pearson—
Longman; 2010
[40] Soroka S. Media, public opinion  
and foreign policy. Harvard 
International Journal of Press and Politics. 
2003;8(1):27-48
[41] Sparks A. Tomorrow Is another 
Country: The Inside Story of South 
Africa’s Negotiated Revolution. Sandton, 
South Africa: Struik Book Distributors; 
1994
[42] Toft M. Ending civil wars: A case 
for rebel victory? International Security. 
2010;34(4):7-36
